Home Rule and Special Legislation in Minnesota by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1963
Home Rule and Special Legislation in Minnesota
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Home Rule and Special Legislation in Minnesota" (1963). Minnesota Law Review. 2787.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2787
Home Rule and Special
Legislation in Minnesota
The Minnesota constitutional provisions on municipal
home rule and special legislation were a source of fre-
quent litigation until they were replaced by article XI in
1958. The author of this Note compares the new and old
provisions, and examines the changes made by article XI.
He concludes that certain defects still exist that can be
cured only by statute or by further amendment.
INTRODUCTION
One method of administering local government in the United
States is through municipalities, which are local units incorporated
either by specific statutes1 or by general constitutional provi-
sions for home rule.' The form of government of a municipality
and the powers it may exercise depend upon the method of its in-
corporation. Units authorized to adopt home rule charters will
have their form of government and their municipal powers set
forth in their charter;3 units created by specific statutes may ex-
ercise only those powers that the statute makes available to
them. In addition, home rule municipalities may be governed by
any statute that the legislature enacts to solve municipal problems
as they arise.
Prior to 1892, local problems in Minnesota were general-
1. Statutes that provide for the incorporation of municipalities may be
either special or general laws. Compare Minn. Sess. Laws 1854, ch. 6,
at 13, a special law providing that "all the country in the County of Ram-
sey contained within the limits and boundaries hereinafter described, shall
be a city by the name of 'Saint Paul' . . . " with MINN. STAT. §§ 411.01,
412.011 (1961), general laws providing for the incorporation of fourth
class cities and villages.
2.
Home rule can be defined as the authority of a city under a state
constitution and laws to draft and adopt a charter for its own govern-
ment. This is very different from legislative control whereby chart-
ers are imposed by special act or general law, which results in cities
having hand-me-down charters from state capitols. Home rule liber-
ates cities to devise forms of government and devise local self-govern-
ment-to get forward with the business of local government, using
local initiative.
Bromage, The Home Rule Puzzle, 46 NAT'L MUNIc. REv. 118 (1957).
3. A municipal charter includes "the entire body of existing laws
which provide for the organization and government of a particular city or
village." In re Hull, 163 Minn. 439, 443, 204 N.W. 534, 535 (1925);
accord, 2 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 9.02 (3d ed. 1949).
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ly solved by special laws relating to one or, at most, a few munici-
palities. If a city wished to issue bonds, for example, it would pe-
tition the legislature to enact a special law giving it authority to
do so. In 1892, a constitutional amendment was adopted that pro-
hibited the legislature from enacting special laws,4 which made the
formulation of a different method for solving municipal problems
essential.' In 1896, section 36 of article IV of the Minnesota Con-
stitution was ratified,6 authorizing municipalities to adopt home
rule charters and to exercise powers under those charters that
were formerly exercised by the legislature through the enactment
of special laws.
With the adoption of section 36, Minnesota became the fourth
state to provide for municipal home rule.' This provision estab-
lished the procedural powers by which a municipality could
frame, adopt, and amend its municipal home rule charter, but it
allowed the legislature to define the substantive powers that a mu-
nicipality could exercise under its charter.' Many municipalities
adopted such charters and thus determined the form of govern-
ment under which they would operate.9
Article XI of the Minnesota Constitution," which was adopt-
4. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 33 (1892).
5. Special laws were required to amend the often restrictive provisions
in complex special municipal charters, for general laws could not be drafted
to meet the peculiar problems of individual municipalities. Anderson,
Municipal Home Rule in Minnesota, 7 MINN. L. REV. 306, 307 (1923);
Dawley, Special Legislation and Municipal Home Rule in Minnesota: Re-
cent Developments, 16 MINN. L. REV. 659, 672 (1932).
6. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 36 (1896) [hereinafter cited as § 36). Amend-
ments made in 1898 and 1942 did not substantially alter the original home
rule provisions of § 36, which remained in force until superseded in 1958
by article XI.
7. Home rule provisions were adopted in Missouri in 1875 and in
California and Washington in 1895. Anderson, supra note 5.
8. Such substantive powers normally include the powers to "perform
services, to regulate or prohibit activities under the police power, and a
broader or more general right to raise revenue to finance city services
and activities." KNEIER, CITY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (3d
ed. 1957).
9. By January of 1963, 90 Minnesota cities were operating under home
rule charters, most of which were obtained pursuant to § 36. League of
Minn. Municipalities, Charter and Election Data on Minnesota Municipal-
ities 2 Jan. 1963. For an analysis of § 36 in operation, see McBAIN, THE
LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 457-97 (1916); Mc-
GOLDRICK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 80-120
(1933); Anderson, Municipal Home Rule in Minnesota, 7 MINN. L. REV.
306 (1923).
10. MINN. CONST. art. XI [hereinafter cited as art. XI] provides:
Local government, legislation affecting. Section 1. The legislature
may provide by law for the creation, organization, administration,
consolidation, division, and dissolution of local government units and
their functions ....
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ed in 1958 to supersede section 36, was designed to solve various
problems that existed under the former law. It substantially re-
vises the law on home rule and permits special legislation under
certain circumstances. The purpose of this Note is to survey the
effect of article XI upon the areas of home rule and special legis-
lation in Minnesota. Each will be discussed separately in terms of
its historical background, the problems that existed under prior
law, the changes made by article XI, the problems that exist under
article XI, and proposals for further legislative action.
I. MUNICIPAL HOME RULE
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Constitutional provisions authorizing home rule may be char-
acterized as either self-executing, permissive, or mandatory.'1 A
Special laws. See. 2. Every law which upon its effective date ap-
plies to a single local government unit or to a group of such units
in a single county or a number of contiguous counties is a special
law and shall name the unit or, in the latter case, the counties, to
which it applies. The legislature may enact special laws relating to
local government units, but a special law, unless otherwise provided
by general law, shall become effective only after its approval by the
affected unit expressed through the voters or the governing body and
by such majority as the legislature may direct. Any special law may
be modified or superseded by a later home rule charter or amend-
ment applicable to the same local government unit, but this does not
prevent the adoption of subsequent laws on the same subject.
Home rule charters. Sec. 3. Any city or village, and any county or
other local government unit when authorized by law, may adopt a
home rule charter for its government in accordance with this constitu-
tion and the laws. No such charter shall become effective without the
approval of the voters of the local government unit affected by such
majority as the legislature may prescribe by general law. If a charter
provides for the consolidation or separation of a city and a county,
in whole or in part, it shall not be effective without approval of the
voters both in the city and in the remainder of the county by the ma-jority required by law.
Charter commissions. Sec. 4. The legislature shall provide by law
for charter commissions. Notwithstanding any other constitutional lim-
itations, the legislature may . . . provide for . . . [the] appointment
[of commission members] by judges of the district court. . . . Home
rule charter amendments may be proposed by a charter commis-
sion or by a petition of five percent of the voters of the local gov-
ernment unit as determined by law and shall not become effective
until approved by the voters by the majority required by law. Amend-
ments may be proposed and adopted in any other manner provided
by law. A local government unit may repeal its home rule charter
and adopt a statutory form of government or a new charter upon the
same majority vote as is required by law for the adoption of a charter
in the first instance.
11. See MOlT, HOME RULE FOR AMtERICA'S CITIES 17-18 (1949). Some
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self-executing provision is detailed enough that municipalities can
frame home rule charters without legislative action. 2 This type of
provision has the obvious advantage of making home rule avail-
able without legislative action; its major defect is that the de-
tails of the procedure of adopting a charter must be included in
the provision itself and, thus, can only be changed by constitu-
tional amendment.' 3 A permissive provision authorizes, but does
not require, the legislature to grant home rule.14 Since a refus-
al by the legislature ever to exercise its power would make home
rule unavailable, this type of provision may be unsatisfactory.'
A mandatory provision grants home rule, but directs the legisla-
ture to provide the enabling legislation whereby municipalities may
obtain charters. 6 Mandatory provisions seem to be subject to the
same criticism as permissive provisions since a legislature's refusal
to enact enabling legislation would make home rule unavailable.
Moreover, even if enabling legislation is passed, it may impose
onerous burdens and restrictions on the procedure of obtaining
charters. 7 However, such provisions have in fact served as an ef-
states have legislative home rule, which is based solely on statutes rather
than a constitutional grant. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 69-1001 (1957).
Such home rule is completely subject to the whims of the legislature
and is generally considered inadequate. See BROMAGE, INTRODUCTION TO
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 120 (2d ed. 1957); MOTT,
op. cit. supra at 15.
12. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 7, which provides that "any
municipality may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government
and may . . . exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government."
Other sections of this article specify the details necessary for a municipal-
ity to adopt, amend, and operate under a home rule charter.
13. See MOTT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 18.
14. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. XV, § 1, which provides that:
Cities, or cities of any particular class, may be given the right and
power to frame and adopt their own charters and to exercise the pow-
ers and authority of local self-government, subject, however, to such
restrictions, limitations, and regulations, as may be imposed by the
Legislature....
15. For example, although the Pennsylvania provision was adopted in
1922, the legislature "consistently refused to implement the grant."
MOTT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 17. In 1949, however, legislation was pass-
ed enabling first class cities to adopt home rule charters. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13101-16 (1957).
16. See, e.g., § 36:
Any city or village in this state may frame a charter for its own
government as a city consistent with and subject to the laws of this
state . . . . Before any city shall incorporate under this act the leg-
islature shall prescribe by law the general limits within which such
charter shall be framed ...
17. The experience with legislative abuse by special legislation in some
states creates a fear of similar abuse in the field of home rule. See Mc-
BAIN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 5-12; Walker, Municipal Government in
Ohio Before 1912, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8, 12-13 (1948).
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fective mandate to the legislature to act promptly and fairly."8 Al-
though section 36 was a mandatory provision and, in addition,
allowed the legislature to supersede provisions in home rule char-
ters merely by enacting general laws on the same subjects, 9
the Minnesota legislature did not abuse its powers, but granted
broad charter-making and substantive powers to municipalities."
B. PROCEDURAL POWERS
1. Article IV, Section 36
Certain weaknesses in the procedural powers enumerated in sec-
tion 36 hampered both the initial adoption and the operation of
home rule charters. A major weakness was the rigidity caused by
the procedural detail in the constitutional provision;- most
changes in the procedure of adopting a charter could be corrected
only by constitutional amendment. Also, the requirement that
charter commission members be chosen by district court judges,
although an efficient and inexpensive method, did not ensure rep-
resentation from the entire cross section of the municipality and
did not make those chosen responsible to the electorate.-- In oth-
er states, the qualified voters of the particular municipality elect
charter commission members.' In addition, the requirement that
the charter commission submit the charter for voter approval with-
in six months of its appointment, if enforced, would not afford
18. Apparently in the "mandatory" states, legislatures have enacted the
required statutes; if a legislature should refuse to implement the mandatory
provision, however, a court probably would not compel it to do so. An
analogous situation is the great hesitancy of courts to require a legisla-
ture to obey a constitutional mandate that it periodically reapportion its
representation. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Magraw v. Don-
ovan, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958); Smith v. Holm, 220 Minn. 486,
19 N.W.2d 914 (1945); State v. District Court, 141 Minn. 1, 168 N.W.
634 (1918); State v. Howell, 92 Wash. 540, 159 Pac. 777 (1916).
19. Section 36 provided that home rule charters "shall always be in
harmony with and subject to the constitution and laws of the state of
Minnesota." The extent of this legislative supremacy was "unlimited save
as to constitutional restrictions." State ex rel. Erickson v. Gram, 169
Minn. 69, 71, 210 N.W. 616 (1926); accord, Monaghan v. Armatage, 218
Minn. 108, 15 N.W.2d 241 (1944); State ex rel. Carmody v. Reed, 132
Minn. 295, 156 N.W. 127 (1916).
20. Minn. Sess. Laws 1899, ch. 351. This enabling act remained virtual-
ly unchanged while § 36 was in force.
21. Section 36 was so detailed that it was the longest single section
in the constitution.
22. See League of Minn. Municipalities, Toward More Effective Home
Rule 4, Sept. 1957.
23. Ibid. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3(a), which provides
that charter commissioners "be elected by the qualified electors of said
city, at any general or special election."
1963]
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enough time to draft a workable charter.24 Further, the require-
ment of a four-sevenths majority for the ratification of a proposed
charter made adoption of home rule charters extremely difficult."9
This was one of the highest voter approval requirements for
home rule in the country; in most states, a bare majority approval
suffices.26 Moreover, the requirement that the charter take effect
30 days after voter approval prevented charter commissions from
deferring the operation of part of the charter to make such further
arrangements as allowing elected officials to serve out the remain-
der of their terms.2"
Since section 36 made no mention of the possibility of abandon-
ing a home rule charter, if one was adopted it was practically ir-
revocable. 8 A home rule municipality could not abandon its ex-
isting charter and adopt another one to replace it by use of the
original adoption procedures.29 Although a new charter could in
effect be adopted by completely amending the old one,30 the
amendment procedure under section 36 was extremely difficult.
24. Apparently no sanctions were imposed in those instances where the
charter was not submitted within a six month period. As a result, this pro-
vision was generally ignored. League of Minn. Municipalities, Toward
More Effective Home Rule 4, Sept. 1957. Compare OKLA. CONST. art.
XVIII, § 3(a), which allows the charter commission only 90 days to sub-
mit a proposed charter to the electorate.
25. Four-sevenths of those voting in the election, not just of those voting
on the provision, were required. This meant that ratifying a municipal char-
ter was more difficult than amending the state constitution, for which only
a bare majority of those voting in the election is needed. MINN. CONST.
art. XIV, § 1. The requirement of a majority of those voting at the elec-
tion was limited in Godword v. City of Minneapolis, 190 Minn. 51, 250
N.W. 719 (1933). There the court held that when a charter amendment
was submitted for voter approval at a general state-wide election, the vote
on the amendment itself constituted a special election, and a failure to
vote on the amendment did not constitute a vote against it. This decision
does not make clear whether the vote on each amendment when several
charter amendments were submitted for ratification at a state-wide elec-
tion constituted a special election. Whether this decision extended to
charters or amendments submitted for voter approval along with other
matters at a regular municipal election is equally unclear.
26. League of Minn. Municipalities, Toward More Effective Home
Rule 4, Sept. 1957; see, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 8; TE-X. CONST.
art. XI, § 5.
27. In this way their replacements could be elected at a regular munici-
pal election. By requiring that the charter take effect within 30 days of its
approval, a municipality might be forced to hold a special election to elect
the new officials. A deferral of the operation of a charter also would allow
a municipality to coordinate its new organization with a tax or budget
year.
28. League of Minn. Municipalities, Toward More Effective Home
Rule 4, Sept. 1957.
29. Leighton v. Abell, 225 Minn. 564, 31 N.W.2d 646 (1948).
30. Ibid. In 1912, for example, St. Paul amended its charter to adopt
the commission form of government. McBAIN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 459.
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A proposed amendment required approval by a three-fifths major-
ity, a number even greater than that necessary for the original rati-
fication of the charter.3' This meant that a municipality might
be forced to operate under a charter that no longer satisfied local
needs. As a result, municipalities turned to the state legislature,
which enacted laws that were general in form but special in effect
to solve local problems.32
An alleged weakness of section 36 was its failure to authorize
county home rule. The fact that large numbers of special laws re-
lating to counties were enacted 3 prompted the suggestion that
the legislature should be given constitutional authority to grant
home rule to counties.3
2. Article XI
The adoption of article XI in 1958 was an attempt to correct
the weaknesses inherent in section 36 by giving "the people and
the legislature the necessary tools to provide for an effective...
31. Under § 36, the amendment of a municipal charter required publi-
cation of the proposed amendment for four consecutive weeks "in a legal
newspaper of general circulation in such city or village" while original
charters could be submitted for voter approval without publication and
could be ratified by four-sevenths (57%) of those voting. The publication
requirement often proved troublesome as evidenced by the number of at-
torney general's opinions dealing with the sufficiency of publication. See,
e.g., MINN. OPS. ATr'Y GEN. 58-M (June 14, 1949); MINN. OPS. AT'Y
GEN. 277-B-2 (June 11, 1948); MiNN. Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 34 (July 30,
1937). But cf. Bowman v. City of Moorhead, 228 Minn. 35, 36 N.W.2d 7
(1949), where the court found the publication defective, but validated the
amended charter and municipal actions thereunder by applying the doctrine
of de facto corporations.
32. Soon after the adoption of MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 33 (1892),
which prohibited special legislation, the legislature began to enact laws that
were special in effect, but general in form. See text accompanying notes
95-97 infra.
33. Of all laws enacted by the Minnesota legislature during the sessions
from 1929 to 1937, approximately 653 (30%) were special laws. Sixty
percent of these (393) were special laws affecting counties. Read, Con-
gestion in the Minnesota Legislature Caused by Requirements of Local
Government, 23 MINN. MUNICIPALITIES 405 (1938).
34. League of Minn. Municipalities, Toward More Effective Home
Rule 5, Sept. 1957. MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 3, now provides for home
rule charters for "any county or other local government unit when author-
ized by law." This is a permissive provision, however, and the legislature
has not enacted statutes enabling counties to obtain home rule. In spite
of the apparent need for county home rule demonstrated by the volume
of special laws dealing with counties, the extent to which such home rule
should be allowed is debatable. Apparently experience with county home
rule in other states has been disappointing. See MADDOX & FUQUAY, STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 497-99 (1962). The desirability of county home
rule is beyond the scope of this Note. For general discussions of county
home rule, see ADRIAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 124 (1960); AN-
DERSON, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND FINANCE IN MINNESOTA 71-72 (1935).
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system of local government, containing substantial 'home rule'
options."35 Three sections in article XI directly deal with home
rule. Section 3 retains the legislative supremacy of section 36 by
guaranteeing to local units the basic right to frame home rule
charters "in accordance with this constitution and the laws." It pro-
vides that a majority of voters in the local unit affected must ap-
prove a proposed charter, but allows the legislature to define the
necessary majority. It also permits city-county consolidation or
separation if approved by the voters in the city and county af-
fected. 6 Section 4 grants authority for the establishment of char-
ter commissions and provides that home rule charters can be
amended or repealed. Section 5 is a saving clause designed to pre-
serve existing home rule charters.
With regard to the procedural requirements of adopting,
amending, superseding, or repealing a charter, article XI is less
rigid than its predecessor; these details are not enumerated in the
constitutional provision itself, but are supplied by the legislature
in enabling legislation enacted pursuant to the constitution. 7 The
procedural requirements may then be modified to comply with
changing municipal needs and conditions by a majority vote in
the legislature rather than a constitutional amendment. In addi-
tion, by means of the enabling acts, the legislature has corrected
many of the defects in the procedural powers provided under sec-
tion 36. Both charters and amendments may now be adopted by
the approval of 55 percent of those voting on the proposal. 8
The charter commission is required to submit a draft of a proposed
charter for voter approval only "as soon as practicable" after the
appointment of the commission,39 not within an arbitrary six
months. Thus, the commission is assured of sufficient time
35. League of Minn. Municipalities, Toward More Effective Home Rule
7, Sept. 1957. Article XI is quoted in note 10 supra.
36. Such consolidation or separation would be accomplished under a
county home rule charter. Since county home rule under art. XI is per-
missive and the legislature has not adopted enabling legislation to effec-
tuate the constitutional permission, consolidation or separation under this
provision is not yet possible. League of Minn. Municipalities, Local
Government Consolidation in Metropolitan Area Under Present Constitu-
tion and Amendment No. 1, at 3, Mar. 20, 1958; see note 34 supra.
37. See MINN. STAT. §§ 410.01-.27 (1961).
38. MINN. STAT. §§ 410.11-.12 (1961) lower the approval require-
ments by about two percent for original charters and five percent for
charter amendments. In addition, those voting at the election but failing
to vote on the charter or amendment no longer effectively vote against
it. Perhaps the 55% vote requirement for the adoption of a proposed
charter is still too high; in most other states a simple majority approval
will suffice to ratify a proposed charter.
39. MINN. STAT. § 410.07 (1961).
in which to draft a sound charter or to determine that a home
rule charter is not necessary or desirable for the municipality in-
volved. Moreover, the commission may defer the operation of the
charter to make such arrangements as allowing incumbent offi-
cials to serve out their terms since the effective date of the char-
ter may be stated in the charter itself.'0
Certain weaknesses in the procedure of adopting and amend-
ing charters still exist, however, because the legislature has fail-
ed to fully exercise the powers granted to it by article XL 1
One weakness is that charter commissioners are still appointed by
district court judges rather than elected. 2 A bill was introduced
during the 1961 legislative session enabling municipalities to pro-
vide in their charters for the popular election of commission mem-
bers to fill vacancies upon the expiration of terms of incumbent
members. 3 If such a provision for the election of commission
members is desirable, it would seem to be equally desirable to
provide for the election of charter commissioners when the com-
mission is initially formed. Election of commissioners should at
least be provided as an alternative to appointment; a municipality
itself could then decide which is the better method of selecting
charter commissioners.
A second weakness is that the legislature has failed to clarify
the provision in article X1 whereby "a local unit may repeal its
home rule charter and adopt a statutory form of government or
a new charter." If a local governmental unit repeals its existing
charter, whether it may return to a statutory form of government
in the absence of legislation is doubtful since the only statutory
provisions, other than home rule, for the incorporation of muni-
cipalities apply solely to villages and to cities of the fourth class.44
40. MINN. STAT. § 410.11 (1961). If no effective date is specified in
the charter, it becomes effective 30 days after it is ratified. Section 36
required the charter to become effective automatically 30 days after it
was ratified by the voters.
41. Many minor defects are present in the home rule enabling act that
should be corrected, primarily in the interest of clarity. For example, the
enabling act does not make clear whether a charter commission must
submit a charter to the voters at all. See generally 45 MINN. MuNici-
PALrrias 151-52 (1960).
42. MINN. STAT. § 410.05 (1961).
43. H.F. 1000, Minn. 1961 Sess. This bill was referred to the Committee
on Municipal Affairs but was not enacted. Since many charter commis-
sions have almost a continuous existence, Professor Anderson has suggested
that the voters at least be given the power to recall the commissioners
appointed by judges and elect persons who are more responsive to local
opinion and needs. ANDERSON, LOCAL GovERNMENT AND FINANCE IN MIN-
NESOTA 69-70 (1935).
44. MINN. STAT. §§ 411.01, 412.011 (1961).
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Article XI provides that municipalities may have the option of re-
turning to a statutory form of government. If the legislature would
implement this provision by allowing all municipalities to return
to their old forms of government should home rule prove unsuc-
cessful, more of them might be encouraged to adopt home rule.
Finally, the procedure for amending a charter is still difficult
and may result in municipalities operating under antiquated char-
ters. A solution adopted in other states is to allow charters to be
amended by municipal ordinances subject to a referendum upon
a petition of the voters.45 The League of Minnesota Municipal-
ities has recommended that the legislature adopt this procedure as
an optional method of amendment.46 This would enable a mu-
nicipality to amend its charter to meet an emergency situation
quickly and to solve routine problems without incurring the ex-
pense of putting a proposed amendment on the ballot in a muni-
cipal election." In addition, this method would permit existing
charters to be more easily brought up to date.48 The proposal in-
cludes safeguards against the abuse of the amendment process-
it prohibits amendments in those areas that, by their nature,
should not be subject to changes made in haste and thus warrant
the use of a more difficult amendment procedure, 9 and in all
other areas, it subjects amendments to the right of referendum.5"
Moreover, if an amendment is adopted that proves to be inade-
quate, it may easily be superseded by a subsequent amendment.
45. E.g., KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 5; WIs. STAT. § 66.01(2) (1961). See
State ex rel. Coyle v. Richter, 203 Wis. 595, 234 N.W. 909 (1931),
where the city of Chippewa Falls, by charter ordinance, changed the form
of the city government from the commission to the aldermanic form.
46. League of Minn. Municipalities, Legislative Proposals Adopted at
the Legislative Conference 4-5, June 22, 1962. The League proposed a
similar bill during the 1961 legislative session. See H.F. 1000, Minn.,
1961 Sess. § 9. This bill narrowly missed passing the House of Represen-
tatives.
47. For example, the Minneapolis home rule charter prevented the
city from mailing paychecks to its employees. Rather than resorting to an
election, the city turned to the legislature and obtained a special law
authorizing the mailing of such checks. See Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, ch.
462. Under the League proposal, this authority could have been obtained
by an ordinance.
48. A major purpose of the proposed legislation is to allow a munici-
pality to "clean up" its old charter in a summary manner by removing
minor restrictions in the charter that are of no importance. League of
Minn. Municipalities, Legislative Proposals Adopted at the Legislative
Conference 4, June 22, 1962.
49. These areas include, inter alia, amendments to change the basic
form of the city government, to increase the tax levy limit, to authorize
new taxes, or to increase the salary of any municipal official.
50. See MINN. STAT. § 410.12 (1961). Additional protection is provided
by the requirement of a two-thirds majority and by public hearing and
publication requirements.
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C. SUBSTANTIVE POWERS
The substantive powers that a home rule municipality may ex-
ercise under its charter may either be defined broadly in the con-
stitutional home rule provision or in the enabling acts, 51 or in ad-
dition to this broad grant, certain powers may be specifically enu-
merated either in the constitutional provision or the enabling
acts.52 Although a broad grant of power provides flexibility,' it
tends to create uncertainty over the scope of the municipality's
substantive powers, which is usually resolved only by litigation."
This was true in Minnesota under section 36. The enabling act it-
selP5 was first attacked because it did not specifically enumerate
the limits of municipal power under home rule charters.58 The
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the statute, stating that the con-
stitution required the legislature to prescribe limits "beyond which
the charter may not go," and since the legislature had prescribed
such limits, it was "not for the court to say that other and further
limits or restrictions should have been imposed."'" This attack
failing, the exercise of particular municipal powers was challenged
51. For example, the American Municipal Association has proposed a
model constitutional provision containing a broad grant of substantive pow-
ers that "is designed to obviate both resort to constitutional specificity and
the need to appeal to the legislature for enabling legislation." Fordam,
Home Rule-AMA Model, 44 NAT'L MUNIc. REV. 137, 140 (1955).
52. These specific powers include, inter alia, those to make police and
sanitary regulations, to levy taxes, to issue bonds, and to organize and
administer public schools. The National Municipal League has proposed
a model state constitutional provision that contains both a broad grant of
power and an enumeration of some of the powers granted to municipali-
ties. See Bromage, Home Rule-NML Model, 44 NAT'L MuNIc. REv.
132, 134 (1955).
53. See MoTT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 18-19.
54.
No more obvious conclusion can be drawn from the study of the dif-
ficulties that have arisen in the home rule states than that the grant
of powers to cities in general terms has been the origin of the chief
complications that have arisen. . . . It is a plain fact that under any
general phrase that makes a direct constitutional grant of home rule
the scope of powers actually conferred must be defined by the courts.
This means uncertainty, delay, and expensive litigation.
McBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRAcTIcE OF MUNICIPAL HoME RULE 669-70(1916). McBain proposed that an enumeration of those powers that have
frequently been the subject of litigation should be added to the constitu-
tional provision. Id. at 672; accord, Bromage, supra note 52.
55. Minn. Sess. Laws 1899, ch. 351.
56. State ex rel. Getchell v. O'Connor, 81 Minn. 79, 83 N.W. 498
(1900).
57. Id. at 86, 83 N.W. at 500. The court said that to adopt the conten-
tion that the act should prescribe limits on each topic with which a charter
could deal "would wholly nullify the purposes intended to be subservcd
and secured by the constitution." Id. at 85, 83 N.W. at 500; accord, Park
v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 296, 159 N.W. 627 (1916).
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in subsequent cases.18 As a result of such litigation, the Minneso-
ta Supreme Court has, to a large extent, defined the scope of sub-
stantive powers under section 36.
Under article XI, the legislature retains its supremacy over local
governmental units. The enabling act under article XI does not
differ materially from the one under section 36.11 Thus, in ab-
sence of judicial decisions under article XI and its enabling act,
the scope of home rule powers does not appear to have been
changed.
In determining whether a particular exercise of municipal pow-
er is within the scope of the substantive powers granted by the
constitution and the enabling act, the Minnesota court applies
three tests. First, the power must not be "expressly or impliedly
withheld" by the constitution or laws of the state.6" Thus, if a gen-
eral law and a charter provision conflict, the general law will pre-
vail unless the charter provision can be interpreted in harmony
with the general law"' or the two differ only as to details. 2 Sec-
ond, the power must be exercised within the territorial limits of
the municipality.63 Third, the exercise of the power must be over
a matter of municipal concern.64
The Minnesota court regards the following as legitimate, sub-
58. See notes 65-70 infra.
59. Compare MINN. STAT. § 410.07 (1961), with Minn. Sess. Laws
1899, ch. 351, § 1.
60. State ex rel. Town of Lowell v. City of Crookston, 252 Minn. 526,
528, 91 N.W.2d 81, 83 (1958). Under § 36, "general laws relating to af-
fairs of cities . . . shall be paramount while in force to the provisions
relating to the same matter included in the local charter. .. ."
61. See Board of Educ. v. Houghton, 181 Minn. 576, 233 N.W. 834
(1930), where a city charter provision that no public improvement could
be made until approved by the city planning commission was held inap-
plicable to school improvements, since otherwise the city officials would
have a veto over a matter of state concern.
62. See Grant v. Berrisford, 94 Minn. 45, 101 N.W. 940 (1904), where
a conflict between a charter provision and a state statute over the time
limit for presenting claims against a surety for a contractor engaged in
the construction of public improvements did not invalidate the charter
provision. But cf. American Elec. Co. v. City of Waseca, 102 Minn. 329,
113 N.W. 899 (1907).
63. See City of Duluth v. Orr, 115 Minn. 267, 132 N.W. 265 (1911),
where the court invalidated an ordinance regulating the storage of ex-
plosives because it applied to an area extending one mile beyond the city
limits.
64. "The general rule is that, in matters of municipal concern, home
rule cities have all the legislative power possessed by the legislature of
the state ...... State ex rel. Town of Lowell v. City of Crookston, 252
Minn. 526, 528, 91 N.W.2d 81, 83 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
stantive municipal powers: police powers,65 taxing powers,"
the right of eminent domain,67 the regulation of local elections,"
and the regulation of service and rates of public utilities.,9 Wheth-
er a municipality may restrict its tort liability is unclear." The
65. City of Duluth v. Cerveny, 218 Minn. 511, 16 N.W.2d 779 (1944);
State ex rel. Zien v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 355, 159 N.W. 792 (1916);
Thume v. Hetland, 114 Minn. 395, 131 N.W. 372 (1911); State ex rel.
Freeman v. Zimmerman, 86 Minn. 353, 90 N.W. 783 (1902).
66. Ramaley v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 406, 33 N.W.2d 19 (1948);
State ex rel. City of Minneapolis v. Erickson, 157 Minn. 200, 195 N.W.
919 (1923).
67. Northern Pao. Ry. v. City of Duluth, 153 Minn. 122, 189 N.W.
937 (1922); State ex rel. Ryan v. District Court, 87 Minn. 146, 91 N.W.
300 (1902).
68. Brown v. Smallwood, 130 Minn. 492, 153 N.W. 953 (1915); Mc-
Ewen v. Prince, 125 Minn. 417, 147 N.W. 275 (1914); Farrell v. Hicken,
125 Minn. 407, 147 N.W. 815 (1914).
69. St. Paul Book & Stationery Co. v. St. Paul Gaslight Co., 130 Minn.
71, 153 N.W. 262 (1915); City of St. Paul v. Robinson, 129 Minn. 383,
152 N.W. 777 (1915).
For early discussions of court-approved municipal powers, see MC-
BAIN, op. cit. supra note 54, at 465-80; McGOLDRICK, LAW AND PRACTICE
OF MuNIcIPAL HOME RULE 97-112 (1933); Anderson, Municipal Home
Rule in Minnesota, 7 MINN. L. REV. 306, 308-13 (1923); Dawley, Special
Legislation and Municipal Home Rule in Minnesota: Recent Developments,
16 MINN. L. REv. 659, 672-78 (1932).
70. This problem was first raised in Schigley v. City of Waseca, 106
Minn. 94, 118 N.W. 259 (1908). Waseca's home rule charter exempted
the city from liability for defective streets and sidewalks unless it had
written notice of a defect at least ten days prior to an injury, and the
court sustained Waseca's demurrer on the ground that the complaint failed
to allege such notice. The court regarded this restriction of the city's tort
liability as having "the force and effect of a direct act of the legislature.
• .." Id. at 102, 118 N.W. at 262; accord, Fuller v. City of Mankato, 248
Minn. 342, 80 N.W.2d 9 (1956). While neither Schigley nor Fuller have
been expressly overruled by subsequent decisions, the legislature has in-
validated charter provisions that prescribe "the form, manner or dura-
tion" of such notice. MINN. STAT. § 465.121 (1961). Although the court
has never expressly said that a home rule charter may not limit municipal
tort liability, dictum in Stevens v. Lycan & Co., 259 Minn. 106, 105 N.W.
2d 889 (1960), indicates that the court would probably hold that a munici-
pality cannot limit its tort liability in any manner.
Various attempts have been made in home rule charters .. . to
limit the liability of municipal corporations in this [tort liability]
area. We have upheld the validity of such charter provisions. They
have now been invalidated by our legislature ....
Id. at 108-09, 105 N.W.2d at 891 (1960).
The issue is further complicated by the recent case of Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962). There the
court upheld the doctrine of sovereign immunity from tort liability as ap-
plied to that case, but prospectively overruled the doctrine as it has been
conferred by judicial decision upon local governmental units with respect
to torts committed subsequent to the adjournment of the 1963 legislative
session. This prospective overruling was made subject to any statutes on
the subject, whether presently in existence or subsequently enacted.
Since the court in Schigley held that home rule charter provisions had
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court does not consider the administration of justice a matter of
municipal concern. 7' Consequently, home rule municipalities may
not establish municipal courts,72 remove a municipal judge73 or
justice of the peace" from office, punish for contempt,75 abro-
gate common-law or equitable rules,7 or confine nontransitory
actions to a specified court.7
II. SPECIAL LEGISLATION
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Special laws are those that apply only to particular persons,
things, or localities within a given class. These laws may deal
either with private matters, such as changing a person's name,
granting a divorce, or chartering a private corporation,78 or with
local problems of a particular municipality, such as authorizing the
construction of a sewer disposal plant or correcting the irregular-
ities in a local bond issue.79
the force and effect of legislative acts, such provisions may be exempt
from the effect of the Spanel decision. The unwillingness of the court in
Spanel to follow the "archaic doctrine" of sovereign immunity, however,
indicates that the court would probably overrule the Schigley and Fuller
cases.
71. See State ex rel. Rosckes v. Dreger, 97 Minn. 221, 106 N.W. 904
(1906).
72. Gordon v. Freeman, 112 Minn. 482, 128 N.W. 834 (1910); State
ex rel. Simpson v. Fleming, 112 Minn. 136, 127 N.W. 473 (1910); State
ex rel. Schissler v. Porter, 53 Minn. 279, 55 N.W. 134 (1893). See also
MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 1, which vests the judicial power of the state in a
"supreme court, a district court, a probate court, and such other courts
. . . with jurisdiction inferior to the district court as the legislature may
establish." But cf. MINN. STAT. § 488.03(3) (1961). This provision estab-
lishes a municipal court in "each city, village, and borough without a
municipal court which is a county seat or which has 1,000 or more inhabi-
tants . . . ," but provides that such a court is not organized until the
governing body of the unit approves it by resolution of four-fifths of its
members; therefore, the municipality itself brings the municipal court
into existence.
73. State ex rel. Simpson v. Fleming, 112 Minn. 136, 127 N.W. 473
(1910).
74. State ex rel. Dann v. Hutchinson, 206 Minn. 446, 288 N.W. 845
(1939).
75. State ex rel. Peers v. Fitzgerald, 131 Minn. 116, 154 N.W. 750
(1915).
76. See Laird Norton Yards v. City of Rochester, 117 Minn. 114, 134
N.W. 644 (1912).
77. See Hjelm v. City of St. Cloud, 129 Minn. 240, 152 N.W. 408
(1915).
78. See, e.g., Minn. Spec. Laws 1867, ch.1 (amending the charter of a pri-
vate corporation); Minn. Spec. Laws 1867, ch. 150 (changing the names of
various persons); Minn. Spec. Laws 1866, ch. 116 (authorizing a guardian
of a certain minor to sell real estate).
79. See, e.g., Minn. Spec. Laws 1866, ch. 54 (authorizing the county
The advantage of special legislation is that it "often fills a need
for localized treatment of a legislative problem."8 Since munici-
palities differ in size, population, and economic conditions, their
problems cannot always be solved by general laws. Thus, if a par-
ticular municipal problem is one that cannot be solved by the
powers granted under a home rule charter, a special law may be
the only solution."1 In addition, the legislature may pass curative
laws, which are special in nature, to cure irregularities or defects
in prior acts."'
A major disadvantage of special legislation is the tendency of
the legislature to enact many special laws where one general law
would serve as welL At one time, "the legislature passed so
many special laws each session that publication of a separate vol-
ume of special laws was required in addition to a somewhat small-
er volume of general laws."'s Such a large number of special laws
reduces the time that legislators have to devote to more important
legislation. Moreover, the legislators may not have time to notify
communities affected by such laws before they are passed. This
may enable special interest groups to secure favorable legislation
that the community affected would not approve. Finally, because
special laws affect only a particular locality, legislators may be
willing to trade votes to ensure that bills affecting their own lo-
cality will or will not be enacted.' As a result of these defects,
several attempts have been made to restrict and even prohibit the
use of special legislation."m
Since special legislation can be justified only when it is used to
deal with local problems of a municipality, prohibitions have been
commissioners of Martin County to issue bonds); Minn. Spec. Laws 1865,
ch. 59 (authorizing Ramsey and Hennepin Counties to build and maintain
a bridge).
80. Peterson, Home Rule Committee Endorses Amendment No. 1, 43
MINN. MuNICIPALITIEs 161 (1958).
81. See City of Duluth v. Orr, 115 Minn. 267, 132 N.W. 264 (1911),
where an ordinance passed by a home rule municipality was invalidated
because the effect of the ordinance extended beyond the city's territorial
limits. The goal sought by the city could be attained today by a special
law.
82. See Anderson, Special Legislation in Minnesota, 7 MINN. L. REv.
133, 188-91 (1923).
83. League of Minn. Municipalities, Toward More Effective Home Rule
2, SepL, 1957.
84. "[I]f a bill is agreeable to the legislators from the district affected
and has been. approved by the governing body of the local government
unit concerned, the bill is generally not opposed by other legislators, be-
cause they are not directly concerned." Ibid.
85. The abuses of special legislation and the need to restrict its usage
were discussed as early as the Minnesota constitutional convention of 1857.
See Anderson, supra note 82.
NOTES1963]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:621
directed largely against the private laws. More than a century ago,
the legislature was denied the power to grant divorces"0 and to
charter private corporations.8 7 Special laws were prohibited in
several other areas in 1881.88 Although these amendments were
successful in eliminating the private laws, local laws continued to
be enacted in great volume. "Special legislation, while changing
somewhat in character, actually increased in quantity." 9
The discontent caused by the continued volume of special legis-
lation prompted a constitutional amendment in 1892 to prohibit
special laws on several additional subjects.9" Besides prohibiting
other types of private laws, this amendment also prohibited local
laws. Moreover, the amendment stated that "in all cases when a
general law can be made applicable no special law shall be en-
acted."'" This clause was not intended to apply solely to those
subjects specifically named in the remainder of the amendment, 2
but was to prohibit special laws on subjects, similar to those speci-
fied, "which might have been omitted through oversight."93 This
amendment was initially successful in halting the flow of special
laws.94 In fact, because the prohibition on local laws caused many
municipal problems to remain unsolved, it helped to bring about
home rule in Minnesota.
When municipalities found that home rule charters did not en-
able them to solve all their local problems, they again turned to
the legislature for help. The legislature responded by enacting laws
that were general in form but special in effect. These "general-
special" laws classified local governmental units according to pop-
ulation, area, assessed valuation, or other criteria; the classifica-
tion, however, was designed to include only particular municipal-
ities.9" The Minnesota court has generally upheld these laws, say-
86. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 28 (1857).
87. MINN. CONST. art. X, § 2 (1857).
88. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 33 (1881), prohibited special laws in II
areas, including such private matters as changing names, granting corporate
powers, and authorizing the sale of real estate by minors, and such
public matters as vacating streets, incorporating towns and villages, and
changing county seats. Art. IV, § 34, states that "the legislature shall
provide general laws for the transaction of any business that may be pro-
hibited" by § 33.
89. Anderson, supra note 82, at 134.
90. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 33 (1892).
91. The amendment left to the courts the question of whether a gen-
eral law could have been made applicable.
92. State ex rel. Board of Courthouse & City Hall Comm'rs v. Cooley,
56 Minn. 540, 546, 58 N.W. 150, 151 (1894).
93. Anderson, supra note 82, at 142.
94. Anderson, supra note 69, at 306.
95. See, e.g., Minn. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 482, § 1(9), which governed
the sale of intoxicating liquor in certain counties. It applied to:
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big that classifications should not be disturbed unless "clearly ar-
bitrary and without reasonable basis."'96 Despite the prohibition on
local laws, the number of these general-special laws steadily in-
creased. 97
This increase in the volume of these general laws that are spe-
cial in effect not only resulted in the normal disadvantages of spe-
cial legislation,98 but also created additional problems. Since such
laws were general in form, they did not name the municipalities
to which they applied. As the number of these laws increased,
they became virtually impossible to locate in the session laws,99
and the status of the law applicable to a particular municipality
could not be readily determined. A further difficulty was that a
municipality might "outgrow" a particular classification. For ex-
ample, if a law classified municipalities according to population,
a mere change in population would make that law inapplicable to
the municipality for which it was designed. Similarly, the popu-
lation of another municipality might increase so that the munici-
pality was within the purview of a law never intended to apply to
it. Finally, since special legislation was again available in the form
of general laws, municipalities would try to obtain such laws to
solve their problems rather than utilize the substantive powers pro-
vided by home rule charters.100
cities of the fourth class situated in any county in this state having not
less than 100 nor more than 110 full and fractional congressional
townships and having a population of not less than 13,000 nor more
than 15,000 inhabitants according to the last federal census.
Some of these general-special laws actually contain the name of the unit
to which they apply. See, e.g., Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 462, which
applies to cities of the first class having at least 450,000 inhabitants and
specifies that "Minneapolis may pay employees by mailing check."
96. Williams v. Rolfe, 114 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn. 1962), 76 HARv.
L. REV. 652 (1963). In this case the constitutionality of a law was challenged
on the ground that it was a special law in violation of MINN. CONST. art.
IV, § 33 (1892), since it contained classification requirements that only
Cass County could satisfy. The court stated that merely because a law
applies to only one county does not make it a special law; it must be
shown that "other counties similarly situated and having like need for
similar legislation are arbitrarily excluded." 114 N.W.2d at 678.
97. In general, there has been an increase in the total number of gen-
eral-special laws enacted from session to session. During 1957, at least
269 of them (27% of all legislation) were enacted. League of Minn. Mu-
nicipalities, Toward More Effective Home Rule 2, Sept., 1957.
98. See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
99. Unlike most general laws, these laws were not codified.
100. League of Minn. Municipalities, Toward More Effective Home
Rule 2, Sept., 1957. For a more detailed development of special legislation
in Minnesota prior to the adoption of art. XI, § 2, see Anderson, supra
note 82, at 187; Dawley, supra note 69.
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B. ARTICLE XI
Section 2 of article XI was in part enacted to eliminate the
problems created by general laws that are special in effect.101 Al-
though this amendment has not reduced the number of spe-
cial laws,'0 2 it has succeeded in eliminating many of the prob-
lems that go with them. It specifically allows the legislature to
enact special laws relating to local governments if the unit affect-
ed approves the law.' Thus special interest groups can no
longer push through special laws without the knowledge or con-
sent of the municipality affected. 4 Since the special law must
name the unit affected, the problem of ascertaining the status of
the law regarding a given municipality is minimized,0 5 and mu-
nicipalities can no longer outgrow a needed law or grow into an
unneeded one.
Section 2 of article XI, however, is not the final answer to the
problem of special legislation. Certain defects exist under this
amendment that should be corrected by further legislative action
or possibly even by further constitutional amendment. Most of
these problems have their origin in the part of section 2 that al-
lows the legislature to enact special laws, but states that "a special
law, unless otherwise provided by general law, shall become ef-
fective only after its approval by the affected unit expressed
through the voters or the governing body ......
One problem concerns the interpretation of the words "ap-
proval by the affected unit." If a special law pertains to more than
one municipality, it is uncertain whether each municipality is an
affected unit or whether the combination of municipalities is the
affected unit.0 6 If approval by a majority of the combination
101. For the text of this provision, see note 10 supra. Article IV, §
33, was amended to be consistent with art. XI; but the prohibitions against
private laws in art. IV, § 28, and art. X, § 2, have not been changed.
102. The number of special laws enacted per session since the amend-
ment remains about the same. In 1961, 260 laws, or about 30% of all
laws enacted, were special laws. League of Minn. Municipalities, Analysis
of Special Legislation Enacted by the 1961 Minnesota Legislature 1, Feb.
8, 1962. This compares with 269 general-special laws enacted in 1957.
See note 97 supra.
103. See MINN. STAT. § 645.021 (1961), which provides the details re-
garding local approval.
104. But see art. XI, § 2, which allows the legislature to provide by
general law that no local approval is required.
105. The problem of finding a special law or determining the legal
status of a given municipality does exist to a lesser extent because special
laws are not codified. However, MINN. STAT. § 482.07(1) (1961), provides
for a table arranged by affected local governmental unit to be included
in the session laws giving approval dates of all special laws approved dur-
ing the two year period included in the volume.
106. For example, if a special law seeks to create a hospital district for
of municipalities affected would be sufficient, the requirement of
local approval would be much easier to satisfy than if each mu-
nicipality had to approve. While there have been no judicial de-
cisions on this issue, the intent of section 2 seems to be that,
absent general laws to the contrary, each municipality affected
must individually approve a special law.Y07
The legislature should consider proposing an amendment to
modify its right to eliminate or alter the necessity of local approval
of special laws.' This right should be restricted to only those
instances where a special law affects multiple units.'09 Local
approval of such a law by all affected units may be either unnec-
essary or impractical to obtain, yet failure to obtain the consent
of one unit may prevent the law from taking effect." However,
where a special law affects only one unit, the approval require-
ment should be mandatory and not subject to elimination or al-
teration by general law. The one instance where the legislature
should exercise its present right to entirely remove the requirement
of local approval arises where special laws affecting multiple units
are purely enabling in nature.' Such laws do not require a
all cities, villages, and townships in the area of Hennepin County, whether
each local governmental unit must consent or whether approval by a ma-jority of the combined units will suffice is unclear.
107. In a memorandum published before the adoption of article XI in
1958, the League of Minnesota Municipalities explained that "the ap-
proval thus required could be given by either the governing body of
the affected unit or units or the voters." League of Minn. Municipalities,
Detailed Comparison of Amendment No. 1 and Present Constitution, ap-
pendix, May, 1958. (Emphasis added.)
108. The language of art. XI, § 2, does not place any restrictions upon
the legislature's right to enact general laws altering or eliminating the local
approval requirement. In enacting such laws, however, the legislature must
be careful to make them general in form, for if they fit the § 2 definition
of special laws, they will also require local approval. It is questionable
whether the legislature could validly remove the requirement of local ap-
proval in all instances since this would clearly be against the intent of § 2.
But the possibility that the court would uphold such legislative abuse
cannot be overlooked, especially in viev of the abuse of classification
that was practiced and condoned under MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 33 (1892).
See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Minn. Extra Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 90, § 3, which provides
for the creation of a sanitary sewer district for six villages and cities.
This law has been approved by all affected units and thus has become ef-
fective.
110. See, e.g., Minn. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 552, which provides for the
creation of a nursing district for 43 cities, villages and townships. This
law has never become effective because it has not been approved by all
affected units.
111. An example of such a special law is Minn. Extra Sess. Laws
1961, ch. 90, § 3, which provides that the governing bodies of any two or
more of the six affected units may create a sanitary sewer district, but
does not require the municipalities to take this action.
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local unit to take any action; they only allow a unit to take ad-
vantage of the legislative provisions if it wishes. Since no obliga-
tions are imposed upon a unit by such laws, there is no reason
to allow the unit to withhold consent and deprive other consenting
units of the benefits of the law.
Where special laws affecting multiple units are not of the pure-
ly enabling type but impose positive obligations upon the named
units,112 local approval should be retained, but the legislature
should make such approval easier to obtain. Both aims may be
accomplished if the legislature would enact a general law sub-
stituting for individual consent a requirement of approval by a
certain majority both in number and in aggregate population of
all units affected. 13 Of course, an element of coercion would
exist under this proposal, for a special law could be forced upon
a nonconsenting unit if the approval requirements were met. The
harshness of this possibility, however, is mitigated by the fact that
each unit would participate in determining the presence of local
approval. Moreover, since majority approval both in number of
units affected and in population would be required, units with
disproportionate populations would be protected from each
other.1
1 4
CONCLUSION
The adoption of article XI by amendment in 1958 effectuated
a major change in the area of local government. This amendment
affords a sound basis for municipal home rule and special legisla-
tion and establishes a workable balance between them. Municipali-
ties may now function with less legislative aid or interference since
home rule charters are easier to obtain and amend, and special
legislation remains available to solve local problems that cannot
be solved under home rule charters. However, certain weaknesses
still exist: the appointment of charter commissioners by district
court judges does not ensure that the commission is responsible to
112. For example, such a law might impose a sanitary sewer district
upon a group of municipalities. This law would be different from an en-
abling law since it would impose positive obligations upon each named
unit.
113. Thus, assuming that the legislature provided for a simple major-
ity, if a law would affect nine municipalities with a total voting popula-
tion of 100,000, approval by the voters of at least five of the municipali-
ties and by a majority of all voters would be necessary for approval.
114. For example, if a special law affected five units, one with voting
population of 100,000 and the remainder with voting population of 2,500
each, the large unit could not force adoption of the law alone simply be-
cause it contained a majority of the affected population. Conversely, the
four smaller units could not combine to force the law's adoption solely
because they comprised a majority of the affected units.
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the electorate; the failure to provide an adequate procedure under
which a municipality may repeal a home rule charter and return
to a statutory form of government may discourage the initial adop-
tion of home rule; the procedure for amending a charter to solve
both routine and emergency problems is too difficult; the local
approval requirement for special laws, in many cases, prevents
needed municipal reforms. The legislature should utilize its
power under article XI to correct these weaknesses and thereby
assure the continuing development of local government in Minne-
sota.

